A literature synthesis of experimental studies on management earnings guidance by Han, J
Title A literature synthesis of experimental studies on managementearnings guidance
Author(s) Han, J
Citation Journal of Accounting Literature, 2013, v. 31 n. 1, p. 49-70
Issued Date 2013
URL http://hdl.handle.net/10722/187627
Rights Creative Commons: Attribution 3.0 Hong Kong License
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2269484
  1
 
 
 
A Literature Synthesis of Experimental Studies on 
Management Earnings Guidance 
 
 
Jun Han 
Associate Professor 
School of Business 
The University of Hong Kong 
Pokfulam Road, Hong Kong 
Tel: (852) 3917 5846 
Fax: (852) 2858 5614 
Email: junhan@business.hku.hk 
 
 
May 2013 
 
 
Journal of Accounting Literature, forthcoming 
 
 
 
I highly appreciate comments from Stephen Asare (the editor), an anonymous reviewer, Wei 
Chen, Terrence Bu Peow Ng, Chul Park, Hun-Tong Tan, and Seet Koh Tan. All errors are my 
own. I highly appreciate excellent research assistance work offered by Yifei Xia. This paper was 
supported by a grant from the Research Grants Council of the Hong Kong Special 
Administrative Region, China (project no. HKU 744009H). 
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2269484
  2
A Literature Synthesis of Experimental Studies on Management Earnings Guidance 
 
Researchers have long been interested in understanding why and how corporate managers issue 
earnings guidance and the effect of such guidance on stakeholders’ (investors’ and managers’) 
behavior. Several recent studies have employed the experimental approach to address these 
issues. The purpose of this paper is to analyze and synthesize the literature on experimental 
studies of management earnings guidance. Consistent with the literature, I organize the synthesis 
to reflect (a) whether, why and how management issues guidance; (b) investors’ reactions to 
guidance; (c) the effect of guidance on management behavior. In addition, I provide institutional 
information (e.g., nature and timing of guidance) about guidance as well as provide several 
directions for future research. The synthesis reveals that the experimental studies have made a 
unique contribution to this literature by (i) providing evidence on process variables that underlie 
some empirical associations, (ii) directly measuring managers’ personal attributes and, (iii) 
closing the causality gap in the guidance literature. 
 
Keywords: Experiment; financial accounting; management earnings guidance; management 
forecast
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Management earnings guidance, or management forecast, refers to “a company publicly 
disclosing its own projections of its financial results for the upcoming quarter or fiscal year” 
[Diamond and Yevmenenko, 2011, p. 44].1 Researchers have had a long and continuing interest 
in examining the antecedents, characteristics, and consequences of management earnings 
guidance [for a review, see Hirst et al., 2008]. The earliest research focused primarily on using 
archival methods to test economic theories of earnings guidance (see Cameron [1986] and King 
et al. [1990] for reviews). Several recent studies have employed the experimental approach to 
test psychology theories of earnings guidance (see Hirst et al. [2008] for a review across all 
methodologies).  
Experimental studies in this area are important since they provide unique advantages that 
are unavailable to other paradigms. First, experimenters are able to hold information constant 
across treatment conditions, and are better able to establish stronger causal relation between the 
independent and dependent variables [Libby et al., 2002]. Second, experimenters can measure 
process variables and provide answers to questions such as why certain phenomena occur [Libby 
et al., 2002]. Finally, experimental research is able to provide ex ante evidence on guidance 
issues for which little or no archival data are available [e.g.,Nelson and Rupar, 2011]. It thus may 
contribute to accounting policy research [Maines, 1994]. Hence, the experimental approach has 
the potential to shed important insights on why and how corporate managers issue earnings 
guidance and the effect of such guidance on stakeholders’ (investors’ and managers’) behavior. 
The purpose of this paper is to provide a comprehensive analysis and synthesis of 
experimental research on management earnings guidance. This literature synthesis is important 
                                                            
1 Several other terms have been used in the literature to refer to particular types of management earnings guidance. 
For example, earnings guidance for negative earnings prospects may be referred to as “earnings warnings” [e.g., 
Libby and Tan, 1999]. 
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in assessing the unique insights that experimental research has offered in understanding the 
guidance literature, identifying gaps in the literature, evaluating the extent to which the 
experimental research corroborates or contradicts archival findings and identifying unresolved 
and important issues for further research. A synthesis is also important to managers, who seek to 
make better disclosure decisions by shedding light on how investors react to disclosures, and to 
regulators, who seek evidence of how investors are impacted by voluntary disclosures, such as 
earnings guidance [Elliott et al., 2007]. 
The experimental literature has concerned itself with whether or not management will 
issue guidance and, if they do, why and how the guidance is issued [e.g., Libby and Rennekamp, 
2012]. Researchers have also been interested in the effect of the presence, nature and form of 
guidance on investors [e.g., Libby and Tan, 1999]; and finally, how does the commitment to 
guide affect management’s contemporaneous and subsequent operating and disclosure behaviors 
[Wang and Tan, 2013]. Corresponding to this research focus, the remainder of this paper is 
structured as follows. I provide background information about the guidance environment by 
introducing and defining key terms and concepts in the next section. The organizing framework 
for synthesizing the extant research follows this (Section 3). In Section 4, I provide a synthesis of 
the literature on whether, why and how corporate managers issue earnings guidance. In Section 5, 
I synthesize the literature on whether, how and why investors react to management guidance. 
Section 6 focuses on whether and how the decision to guide affects the guider’s behavior. The 
last section explores directions for future research and offers concluding remarks. 
2. BACKGROUND AND CONCEPTS 
Some public companies have a long history of voluntarily disclosing projections of their 
financial results for the upcoming quarter or fiscal year. This practice, referred to as providing 
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earnings guidance, became more common during the latter half of the 1990s, after the US 
congress enacted the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, which included safe 
harbor provisions for such projections [Hsieh et al., 2006]. The impetus for providing guidance is 
a subject of continuing debate with lower share price volatility, higher valuations, stock liquidity 
and maintaining good communication with market participants cited as some of the potential 
benefits [Hsieh et al., 2006]. In recent years, there has been a slow down in the rate of growth in 
the number of companies issuing guidance and some companies, like general Electric and 
McDonald’s corporation, have stopped issuing guidance [also called “going dark”; Fuller and 
Jensen, 2010].  
It is this institutional richness that has attracted research into the earnings guidance 
process. In the remainder of this section, I introduce and define several key terms and concepts 
that researchers employ in this literature to facilitate the subsequent analysis and synthesis.  
2.1 Guidance Timeline 
Guidance timeline issues arise because of management’s ability to control the timing of 
earnings guidance. Management may provide earnings guidance at any time before the actual 
earnings announcement date [i.e., the release of actual earnings; Hirst et al., 2008)].2 Usually the 
earnings guidance for the upcoming quarter or fiscal year is short-term guidance while guidance 
for more distant fiscal period is long-term guidance [Cheng et al., 2005]. There is 
interdependence between management earnings guidance and analysts’ earnings forecasts. One 
motive for managers to provide earnings guidance is to align market expectation (primarily the 
analysts’ forecasts) with their own earnings expectations [Ajinkya and Gift, 1994]. 
                                                            
2 US federal securities law require companies to only file an annual report on the Form 10K or a quarterly report on 
the Form 10Q. In practice, most companies voluntarily release their earnings before filing their annual or quarterly 
reports [Hsieh et al., 2006]. 
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Correspondingly, researchers generally find that analysts often revise their earnings forecasts 
subsequent to management earnings guidance [e.g., Baginski and Hassell, 1990]. 
Management often provides earnings guidance contemporaneous, in time and venue (e.g., 
at the earnings conference call), with the announcement of the current actual earnings results. 
This phenomenon is commonly referred to as “bundled guidance” [Rogers and Buskirk, 2013; 
for additional institutional information on the intersection of earnings guidance and earnings 
release, see Diamond and Yevmenenko, 2011].  
2.2 Guidance News Valence 
The guided EPS (Earnings per Share) is usually compared with an earnings benchmark to 
define its news valence; i.e., whether the guidance news is positive (when the guided EPS is 
more positive than the benchmark) or negative (when the guided EPS is more negative than the 
benchmark). If there are analysts following the guiding company, usually the analysts’ consensus 
forecast (mean forecast of all analysts following the guiding company) is used as a proxy for the 
market expectation at that time and therefore the comparison benchmark [e.g., Tan et al., 2002]. 
An alternative earnings benchmark, if there is no analysts’ consensus forecast available, can be 
prior EPS [Degeorge et al., 1999].  
2.3 Guidance News Division 
At the time that actual earnings become available, comparisons can be made among the 
actual earnings, the prior guided earnings and the relevant benchmark (as discussed above). In 
this vein, “total earnings news” is defined as the difference between actual EPS and the most 
recent relevant benchmark. Total earnings news can be decomposed into “guidance news” and 
“actual earnings news.” Guidance news refers to the difference between guided EPS and the 
relevant benchmark just prior to the guided EPS. Actual earnings news refers to the difference 
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between guided and actual EPS [Tan et al., 2002]. A guiding firm has non-zero guidance news, 
and total earnings news is split into guidance news and actual earnings news. In particular, a 
guiding firm has no actual earnings news and guidance news equals to total earnings news if the 
guided EPS equals to actual EPS. A non-guiding firm, obviously, has no guidance news and total 
earnings news equals to actual earnings news. 
2.4 Guidance Forms 
Managers may choose different forms of guidance that reflect different degrees of 
precision [Hughes and Pae, 2004]. In particular, earnings guidance can take the form of point 
guidance, range guidance, one-sided (minimum or maximum) guidance, and qualitative guidance, 
in descending order of precision [e.g., Han and Tan, 2007].3 Archival studies generally show that 
managers use different guidance forms to express their uncertainty regarding future earnings 
[Hirst et al., 2008]. The higher the environmental uncertainty, the less precise the earnings 
guidance becomes [Hughes and Pae, 2004]. 
2.5 Guidance Accuracy and Bias 
Guidance accuracy is defined by comparing the guided EPS with the actual EPS; i.e., the 
smaller the magnitude for the actual earnings news, the more accurate the earnings guidance is. 
There is an upward (downward) bias when guided EPS is higher (or lower) than the actual EPS. 
If guided EPS is always biased in a given direction with the same magnitude, the bias is a 
consistent bias. In contrast, if EPS guidance is always biased in a given direction but with 
varying magnitudes, it is referred to as an inconsistent bias [Tan et al., 2010]. 
                                                            
3 There is a single number provided in the typical point guidance (e.g., “EPS for this quarter is expected to be $1”). 
There are both maximum and minimum limits provided in the typical range guidance (e.g., “EPS for this quarter is 
expected to be between $0.9 and $1.1”). If there is only a maximum (minimum) limit available in earnings guidance, 
it is a one-sided guidance (e.g., “EPS for this quarter is expected be to more than (less than) $1”). Finally, in a 
qualitative guidance, there is no number but only a narrative description (e.g., “I am optimistic about EPS for this 
quarter”). 
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2.6 Guidance Frequency and Guidance Commitment 
Guidance frequency refers to how often a company provides earnings guidance. In the 
sample of Bhojroj et al. [2012], 10.75% companies provide earnings guidance only once in a 
year; while around 34.45% companies provide earnings guidance 10 times or more annually. 
Guidance predictability is defined by how easily outsiders (such as the analysts) are able to 
predict whether, how, and when managers may provide earnings guidance in the future based on 
their historical earnings guidance pattern [Venkataraman, 2008]. “For example, a firm that issues 
three forecasts over a three-year period and does so every year in December is a more committed 
discloser relative to a firm that issues three forecasts in a random fashion over that same time 
period” [Venkataraman, 2008, p. 6]. Guidance commitment is defined on both guidance 
frequency and guidance predictability so that a more frequent and/or more predictable guider is 
more committed than a less frequent and/or less predictable guider [Venkataraman, 2008]. 
2.7 Guidance Disaggregation  
Managers often provide their earnings guidance with other quantitative or qualitative 
information [e.g., Hirst et al., 2007]. When management earnings guidance is accompanied with 
guidance on other income statement line items (e.g., revenue, cost of goods sold, etc.,) it is called 
“disaggregated earnings guidance.” In contrast, it is known as “aggregated earnings guidance” if 
guidance is provided only for the bottom-line earnings numbers [net income, EPS, etc.; Hirst et 
al., 2007]. 
To sum up, a guiding company has discretion not just over the guidance decision but also 
over the timing, form, frequency, level of aggregation, and consistency of the guidance. Further, 
guiding companies may decide to stop providing guidance. Once guidance is provided, market 
participants can assess the information content, accuracy, bias and valance of the guidance using 
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various benchmarks. In turn, these issues raise a plethora of researchable questions, several of 
which have been studied using experimental techniques. I next present an organizing framework 
that I used to discuss these experimental studies.   
3. Organizing Framework 
Figure 1 presents the organizing framework for the synthesis, which captures 
experimental researchers’ current focus on understanding management’s decision to guide and 
how that decision affects investors and management. In the framework, management decides to 
guide (or not to guide) and the nature, form, and frequency of this guidance. I refer to these as 
the guidance characteristics. Research has examined guider and environmental attributes that 
affect the decision to guide and the guidance characteristics. Guider attributes are attributes of 
the guiding firm or management, such as the firm’s earnings record and the manager’s personal 
attributes. Environmental factors are factors outside of the firm and/or management’s control that 
may play a role in the management earnings guidance process. This includes the operating and 
regulatory environment, peer company’s earnings guidance behavior, etc. The second strand of 
research has focused on the effect of the guidance characteristics (sometimes interacting with the 
guider attributes and/or the environmental attributes) on investors and management.  
Accordingly, I first analyze and synthesize the literature on guider attributes and/or 
environmental attributes that determine whether and how management issue earnings guidance 
(Section 4). Next, I synthesize the literature on investors’ reactions to guidance (Section 5). 
Finally, I discuss how guidance can affect the guider (Section 6). 
Hirst et al. [2008] employ a framework of forecast antecedents – forecast characteristics – 
forecast consequences to review the area of management earnings guidance (including both 
experimental and archival studies).  My synthesis extends their important work in three respects. 
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First, I separately compare guiding firms versus non-guiding firms (in Section 5.2.1), which is 
not discussed by Hirst et al. [2008]. Second, in Hirst et al. [2008], both environmental factors 
and forecaster characteristics (comparable to guider attributes in my framework) are forecast 
antecedents that determine whether management issue earnings guidance. In contrast, in my 
review, guider attributes and environmental factors appear as both guidance determinants and 
moderators of the effect of guidance characteristics, according to whether such guider attributes 
and/or environmental factors affect management earnings guidance decision or investors’ 
reactions to management earnings guidance. Third, I further divide guidance characteristics into 
guidance record characteristics and specific guidance characteristics, which is absent in Hirst et 
al. [2008]. 
 
Insert Figure 1 Here 
 
4. Whether, Why and How Management Issues Guidance 
 As indicated in Figure 1, research has examined guider and environmental attributes that 
affect the decision to guide and the guidance characteristics. With respect to guider attributes, 
prior research has examined the effect of guiders’ confidence and incentives on whether and how 
to provide guidance. With respect to environmental attributes, prior research has examined the 
effect of environmental uncertainty on the form of guidance. 
4.1 Guider Attributes (Overconfidence Effect) 
There is a paucity of research on the extent to which managers’ personal attributes affect 
their decision to guide. The only experimental study in this area is Libby and Rennekamp [2012], 
which shows that overconfident managers are more likely to perceive that the benefits associated 
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with earnings guidance exceed its costs; hence, overconfident managers are more likely to issue 
earnings guidance. This finding holds regardless of whether the overconfidence is induced by 
self-serving attribution (attributing better task performance to skill or ability rather than to luck 
or the task being less difficult) or is an inherent personal trait [Libby and Rennekamp, 2012] . 
This experimental finding corroborates the archival study that shows that managers’ 
overconfidence does affect their tendencies to issue earnings guidance at a market level [Hribar 
and Yang, 2011]. Compared with archival research, experimental studies have the advantage of 
providing a clean and direct measure of managers’ personal attributes and hence more 
experimental studies are needed that examines the effects other personal attributes. 
4.2 Guider Attributes (Incentive-or-Pressure-to-Manipulate Effect) 
Managers who provide disaggregated guidance have the discretion over the choice of  
line items (e.g., revenue, research and development expenses, etc.) to add to the earnings 
guidance [Hirst et al., 2007].  Holderness and Hunton [2011] show that managers who are under 
pressure to manipulate earnings are more likely to disaggregate earnings guidance for line items 
that are not manipulated, but not to provide guidance on items where manipulations are involved. 
However, managers who do not face pressure to manipulate earnings are not likely to issue 
disaggregated guidance in such a strategic manner. 
4.3 Environmental Attributes (Environmental Uncertainty) 
Archival studies show that guidance form is often used to express management’s 
estimation uncertainty [e.g., Hughes and Pae, 2004]. Specifically, the higher the earnings 
uncertainty, the less precise guidance form management tends to use [Hughes and Pae, 2004]. An 
experimental study by Du et al. [2011] corroborates this finding. Du et al. [2011] ask the 
participants in their experiment to provide their own earnings estimates, without restricting the 
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form of the estimates. Du et al. [2011] find that participants are more likely to provide point 
estimates in a highly informed (therefore less uncertain) scenario, but they are more likely to 
provide range estimates in a poorly informed (therefore highly uncertain) scenario. 
5. HOW AND WHY INVESTORS REACT TO MANAGEMENT GUIDANCE 
In this section, I review studies on 1) how earnings guidance characteristics affect 
investors’ reactions to the earnings guidance. Guidance characteristics are divided into: a) 
guidance record characteristics, i.e., how does management earnings guidance behave over time 
(Section 5.1); and b) specific (or one-time) guidance characteristics (Section 5.2). Next, I review 
how guider attributes and/or environmental attributes interact with guidance characteristics to 
affect investors’ reactions (Section 5.3). 
5.1. Guidance Record Characteristics  
5.1.1 Prior Guidance Accuracy (or Bias) 
Investors’ reactions to current guidance forms depend on the firm’s prior guidance record 
[Hirst et al., 1999]. One line of research focuses on prior guidance accuracy, that is, magnitude of 
the difference (be it positive or negative) between actual EPS and the guided EPS. This line of 
research shows that investors are more confident in their own earnings estimates when more 
precise point guidance is provided than less precise range guidance; but this effect only exists 
when the company has an accurate prior earnings guidance record. When the company has an 
inaccurate prior guidance record, investors do not react to guidance forms [Hirst et al., 1999].  
In Hirst et al. [1999], prior management guidance is manipulated to be without obvious 
bias. Some studies investigate biased EPS guidance. For instance, Tan et al. [2010] show that 
compared to a consistent bias record, an inconsistent bias record gives analysts stronger excuse 
not to adjust for bias in earnings guidance. That is, analysts are more likely to follow earnings 
guidance (i.e., to copy management guided EPS in their own forecasts) if prior guidance is 
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inconsistently biased (than consistently biased), even though the analysts are aware of the bias 
contained in management guidance. 
5.1.2 Guidance Frequency (or Guidance Commitment) 
Investors’ views about a manager’s commitment to disclosure also depend on the 
manager’s prior guidance accuracy. More committed guiders are regarded as more credible than 
less committed guiders when prior guidance is accurate. When prior guidance is inaccurate, 
investors’ views on more versus less committed guiders reverses; i.e., less committed guiders are 
more credible than more committed guiders [Venkataraman, 2008]. 
5.1.3 Guidance Retractions and Corrections 
Managers sometimes retract or correct previous earnings guidance. “Retraction” refers to 
the cancellation or withdrawal of previous guidance, and “correction” refers to replacing the 
original erroneous disclosure with a new disclosure correcting any erroneous information 
contained in the previous disclosure. Tan and Koonce [2011] find that when there is a retraction 
of a piece of earnings-relevant news (but no new information is provided), the effect of previous 
erroneous information linger (i.e., investors cannot fully eliminate the impact of erroneous news 
even though they are explicitly informed of its invalidity). In contrast, when there is a correction 
(with new information provided), investors tend to overreact; i.e., they react more strongly to the 
correct news with the contrast of erroneous news, than to the correct news alone [Tan and 
Koonce, 2011]. 
5.2 Specific Guidance Characteristics 
5.2.1 Earnings News Division 
In this section, I review research on 1) how and why investors react differently to firms 
that guide versus firms that do not guide; and 2) how investors react differently for firms with 
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different earnings news division strategies. While analysts claim that they welcome warnings of 
future earnings disappointments, archival researchers document that market reactions are more 
negative for firms that warn than for firms that do not warn [e.g., Kasznik and Lev, 1995]. Libby 
and Tan [1999] argue that the disparity between what analysts say (i.e., analysts welcome 
warnings of upcoming negative news) and what analysts do (i.e., analysts punish warnings firms) 
is a result of two processes: (1) analysts sequentially evaluate company earnings guidance and 
actual earnings when they make earnings and investment-related judgments, (2) analysts 
simultaneously review guidance and actual earnings news when they make comments about the 
desirability of earnings warnings. Libby and Tan [1999] provide evidence consistent with 
different information processing (sequential versus simultaneous) as an explanation for the 
seemingly paradoxical findings. 
Libby and Tan [1999] examine investors’ short-term reactions to guiding firms. Mercer 
[2005], in contrast, suggests that managers should not place too much emphasis on whether to 
provide earnings guidance. Mercer [2005] finds that, although in the short-term, management 
credibility is assessed to be higher for guiding firms than for non-guiding firms, in the long run 
management credibility is determined largely by whether total earnings news is positive or 
negative. 
Assuming that managers are able to precisely predict total earnings news and they decide 
to issue earnings guidance, they need to decide how to split total earnings news into guidance 
news and actual earnings news. Broadly speaking, a manager can overstate, accurately state, or 
understate the total earnings news in his/her guidance.4 Tan et al. [2002] suggests that different 
                                                            
4For example, EPS for the coming quarter is 10 cents higher than the analysts’ consensus forecast. In guidance, the 
firm manager may state in guidance that EPS will be 15 cents higher than the consensus analysts forecast 
(overstate), while the actual EPS is 5 cents lower than the guided EPS. The firm manager may state in guidance that 
EPS for the coming quarter will be 10 cents higher than the analysts’ consensus forecast (accurately state), and the 
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guidance strategy may lead to different investors’ reactions, depending on whether total earnings 
news is positive or negative. Mental accounting theory [Thaler, 1999] suggests that providing 
two pieces of news with the same sign may increase investors’ reactions relative to a single piece 
of news; in contrast, providing two pieces of news with contradicting signs may alleviate 
investors’ reactions relative to a single piece of news. Based on this argument, Tan et al. [2002] 
suggest that for a firm with positive total earnings news, the best strategy is to split the total 
earnings news into two pieces of smaller positive news (i.e., to understate the positive total 
earnings news in its earnings guidance), and the worst strategy is to overstate the positive news 
in guidance, while having negative actual earnings news. In contrast, for a firm with negative 
total earnings news, the best strategy is to overstate the negative news in guidance, while having 
positive actual earnings news; and the worst strategy is to split the total earnings news into two 
pieces of smaller negative news (i.e., to understate the negative total earnings news in its 
earnings guidance). The effect of an accurate guidance strategy lies in the middle for both 
positive and negative domains.   
Tan et al.’s [2002] findings are consistent with several theories. One is cue consistency 
theory, which argues that two earnings signals of consistent signs result in stronger investors’ 
reactions than two earnings signals of opposite signs [Slovic, 1966]. The second theory is 
recency effect, which predicts that investors’ reactions are predominantly determined by the 
more recent actual earnings news than by the earlier guidance news [Hogarth and Einhorn, 1992]. 
Another theory is diminishing marginal reaction theory, which predicts that investors’ marginal 
reactions to an earnings signal diminish as the magnitude of the earnings news increases [Thaler, 
1999]. Miller [2006] attempts to discriminate among the three theories and employs a setting of 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
actual EPS turns out be the same as the guidance. Or, the firm manager may state that EPS for the coming quarter 
will be 5 cents higher than the analysts’ consensus forecast (understate), and the actual EPS turns out to be 5 cents 
higher than the guided EPS. 
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understated positive total earnings news (i.e., both guidance news and actual earnings news are 
positive). There are three scenarios in Miller [2006]. One is that total earnings news is divided 
equally into guidance news and actual earnings news; one is that total earnings news is divided 
into a piece of larger guidance news and a piece of smaller actual earnings news; and the other 
scenario is that total earnings news is divided into a piece of smaller guidance news and a piece 
of larger actual earnings news. Cue consistency theory would predict similar reactions across the 
three scenarios. Recency theory predicts that investors’ reactions are highest when the total 
earnings news is divided into a piece of large actual earnings news and a piece of small guidance 
news, followed by when the total earnings news is divided equally between the guidance news 
and the actual earnings news, then lowest when the total earnings news is divided into a piece of 
large guidance news and a piece of small actual earnings news. Diminishing marginal reaction 
theory predicts that investors’ reactions would be stronger when the total earnings news is 
divided equally into the guidance news and the actual earnings news, relative to being divided 
into one piece of large news and one piece of small news. Miller’s [2006] result is consistent 
with diminishing marginal reaction theory, but inconsistent with other competing theories such as 
cue consistency effect or recency effect. 
The above studies examine the division between the guidance news and the actual 
earnings news in a single-firm setting. That is, they do not consider whether investors’ reactions 
to a given firm’s earnings guidance are affected by the guidance strategy of similar firms in the 
same industry. Maletta and Zhang [2011] extend Miller [2006] to a multi-firm setting. They find 
that Miller’s [2006] finding may not hold once the peer firm’s guidance strategy is considered 
(see Section 5.3.5). 
5.2.2 Guidance News Valence 
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A few studies have examined how the predicted effect varies with guidance news valence 
(i.e., whether the guidance news is positive or negative, see Table 1). Some studies show that the 
proposed effect varies symmetrically across positive and negative guidance news domain [e.g., 
Tan et al., 2002; Libby et al., 2006; Rennekamp, 2012]. By applying mental accounting theory, 
Tan et al. [2002] show that for positive (negative) guidance news, understating total earnings 
news in guidance news leads to more positive (negative) reactions than accurate guidance news, 
which in turn leads to more positive (negative) reactions than overstating total earnings news in 
guidance news. Libby et al. [2006] show that for positive (negative) total earnings news, narrow 
range guidance (where the actual EPS exceeds the whole range) leads to more positive (negative) 
investors’ reactions compared with point guidance, whereas wide range guidance (where the 
actual EPS misses the whole range) leads to less positive (negative) investors’ reactions 
compared with point guidance. Similarly, Rennekamp [2012] shows that compared with less 
readable disclosure, more readable disclosure leads to more positive (negative) investors’ 
reactions for positive (negative) guidance news. 
Some studies show that the proposed effect varies asymmetrically across positive and 
negative guidance news [Du, 2009; Han and Tan, 2010]. Investors are ambiguity averse (seeking) 
for negative (positive) guidance news, hence investors favor range (point) guidance when the 
news is positive [negative; Du, 2009]. Given that positive guidance is inherently less credible 
(therefore more elastic) than negative guidance, Han and Tan [2010] propose that motivated 
reasoning is more likely to happen for positive guidance than negative guidance.  
5.2.3 Guidance Forms 
In this section I review studies on how investors react to forms of earnings guidance. 
Research on guidance forms focuses on comparing point and range guidance [e.g., Hirst et al., 
  18
1999; Libby et al., 2006]. The primary reason for the popularity of point and range guidance in 
research is the ease with which information can be held constant between them [Hirst et al., 
1999]. Researchers normally set the midpoint of range guidance equal to point guidance, and 
point guidance can thus be viewed as extreme range guidance where the range width is zero 
[Hirst et al., 1999]. 
Hirst et al. [1999] suggest that guidance form affects investor confidence, with investors 
being more confident when management guidance takes the form of more precise point guidance 
than less precise range guidance. Hirst et al. [1999] suggest, however, that guidance form does 
not affect investors’ earnings estimates. Du [2009] extends Hirst et al. [1999] in two ways. First, 
Du [2009] shows that although investors’ earnings estimates are not affected by guidance form, 
their resource allocation (investment dollar amount) decision (between a firm issuing point 
guidance versus a firm issuing range guidance) is affected by guidance form. Second, investors’ 
resource allocation decision depends on whether the guidance news is positive or negative. 
Specifically, investors prefer ambiguity for positive news but they are ambiguity averse for 
negative news. Hence investors allocate more resource to the firm issuing range (point) guidance 
when the news is positive (negative).  
More recent research extends Hirst et al. [1999] by documenting that, although investors’ 
post-guidance earnings estimates are not affected by guidance form, their earnings re-estimates 
after the actual earnings announcement are affected by guidance form [Libby et al., 2006; Han 
and Tan, 2007]. Libby et al. [2006] show that when the actual earnings are higher (lower) than 
point guidance (which equals to the midpoint of range guidance), investors’ reactions are most 
positive (negative) for narrow-range guidance (where the actual earnings exceed the high-end of 
the narrow range), followed by point guidance, then by wide-range guidance (where actual 
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earnings are lower than the high-end of the wide range).  Han and Tan [2007] corroborates 
findings of Libby et al. [2006] by proposing and testing a set of multiple-reference-point rules, 
and comparing point and range guidance with a hybrid guidance form -- MID guidance.5 Du et al. 
[2011] propose a two-stage process to explain investors’ preference for point or range 
management earnings guidance. First, congruity principle [Badescu and Wallsten, 1995] argues 
that investors prefer a guidance form that is congruent with the environmental uncertainty. Based 
on this argument, investors prefer point guidance when the environmental uncertainty is very low. 
Otherwise, investors prefer range guidance. Second, as the range guidance gets wider, it loses 
informativeness although it is more accurate (i.e., more likely to contain actual EPS). Investors 
prefer narrow range guidance to wide range guidance due to the informative advantage of narrow 
range guidance (than wide range guidance). Hence, in most cases, investors prefer narrow range 
guidance to point guidance and/or wide range guidance. 
5.2.4 Guidance Timing  
Analysts may react differently to EPS guidance issued at different points in time. Libby et 
al. [2008] show that analysts tend to be more optimistic at earlier points in time than at later 
points in time due to analysts’ incentives to please management, so that it is easier for the actual 
earnings to meet or beat the analysts’ forecast. Hence analysts are more likely to adjust for any 
optimistic bias in management guidance if the guidance is provided later but not earlier [Libby et 
al., 2008]. Libby et al.’s [2008] findings are consistent with findings of archival studies 
[Richardson et al., 2004]. More importantly, Libby et al. [2008] establish the causal relationship 
                                                            
5 A typical format of MID guidance is, for example, “EPS is expected to be $1, plus or minus $0.1.” 
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between analysts’ relationship incentives (see page 23) and the optimistic-to-pessimistic pattern 
in analysts’ forecasts.6 
5.2.5 Guidance Disaggregation 
The literature documents several benefits of disaggregated guidance to the guider. For 
example, Hirst et al. [2007] find that for positive guidance news, which is typically less 
believable than negative guidance news, disaggregated guidance leads investors to perceive 
higher management credibility (relative to aggregated guidance), hence leads to lower cost of 
capital, particularly when managers have strong incentives to manipulate earnings. More recent 
research suggests that such benefits of disaggregated guidance may be limited to point guidance 
(which is fairly precise), but not to range guidance [which is less precise; Fleming, 2009]. 
Another benefit with issuing disaggregated guidance is that it reduces investor fixation on net 
income7 [Elliott et al., 2011], because disaggregated guidance facilitates investors’ activation of a 
knowledge structure in which net income is one of several inputs to evaluate company 
performance, rather than a knowledge structure where net income is the sole sufficient 
performance measure. 
Nevertheless, certain costs (to the guider) are associated with issuing disaggregated 
guidance. Disaggregated guidance makes it more difficult for managers to hide earnings 
manipulation activities, because more detailed and specific guidance restrict managers’ ways to 
maneuver earnings results [Holderness and Hunton, 2011].  
                                                            
6  Optimistic-to-pessimistic pattern refers to the observation that analysts’ early earnings forecasts are usually 
optimistic, then analysts gradually “walk down” their earnings forecasts, until the forecasts become pessimistic (so 
that the actual EPS is able to meet or beat analysts’ forecasts) when it comes to the actual earnings announcement 
date [Richardson et al., 2004]. 
7 Investors’ earnings fixation refers to investors’ tendency to over rely on the bottom-line earnings figure while 
neglect other relevant information [Elliott et al., 2011]. 
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5.2.6 Sensitivity Analysis 
Future earnings results are sometimes subject to the influence of factors beyond 
management control. For example, an airline company’s earnings are affected by oil prices, and 
the general interest rate environment affects a financial company’s performance. It is common 
practice for firms to disclose future earnings sensitivity to such external, uncontrollable factors. 
Koonce et al. [2005] examine how investors respond to one-sided loss-only sensitivity disclosure, 
which is mandated under current accounting standards (SEC Financial Reporting Release No. 
48). Koonce et al. [2005] indicate that investors likely infer a smaller amount of potential gain 
than the disclosed loss amount. However, such inference corresponds to the company using a 
fairly infrequent risk management strategy. Nelson and Rupar [2011] study whether investor risk 
assessment is affected by numerical disclosure versus percentage disclosure for potential 
downside risk. Nelson and Rupar [2011] find that numerical disclosure leads to higher risk 
assessment compared with percentage disclosure, but only when the disclosure format is 
mandatory rather than discretionary. Investors subconsciously anchor on the bigger number 
(compared with percentage) and therefore infer higher risk. They reason that when managers 
have discretion over numerical versus percentage disclosure, investors may view a percentage 
disclosure as the manager’s attempt to understate downside risk, which investors counter-react 
by raising their risk assessment. 
5.2.7 Narrative Disclosures 
Disaggregated earnings guidance and sensitivity analysis both relate to quantitative 
information contained in management earnings guidance. Another stream of research examines 
the narrative words used in management earnings guidance (i.e., narrative disclosure). Several 
dimensions of narrative disclosure have been examined in the literature. 
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Scenario construction. Sedor [2002] finds that analysts are subject to “scenario thinking;” 
wherein a manager’s earnings guidance is assessed to have a higher probability of being realized 
if it is described in a scenario than if it is provided in a simple list of facts.8 Sedor’s [2002] 
findings compliment archival research on analyst optimism in earnings guidance where it is 
usually suggested that analyst optimism is solely driven by their incentive to please management 
[Cowen et al., 2006]. However, Sedor [2002] suggests that such optimism can be an 
unintentional cognitive bias rather than a result of any economic or business incentive. Kadous et 
al. [2006] extend Sedor [2002] by investigating how to reduce analyst optimism induced by 
scenario thinking. Drawing from psychology literature, Kadous et al. [2006] suggest that asking 
analysts to provide reasons why managers could fail (“counter-explanations”) may reduce the 
effect of scenario thinking, but only if it is easy to generate the counter-explanations (e.g., asking 
analysts to generate 2 counter-explanations compared to 12 counter-explanations). 
Readability. Readability refers to the ease with which text can be read and understood 
[Tan et al., 2012, p. 7]. Rennekamp [2012] examines how readability of the guidance press 
release affects investors’ reactions. Rennekamp [2012] finds that investors’ reactions are more 
extreme (i.e., more negative for negative guidance and more positive for positive guidance) in 
response to more readable disclosures. Tan et al. [2012] suggest that more readable disclosures 
are associated with higher management credibility, but this effect is stronger when the message 
content is inconsistent (e.g., actual earnings beat one benchmark but miss the other) than when 
the message content is consistent (e.g., actual earnings consistently beat multiple benchmarks). 
The implication is that message delivering (here, readability) does not matter so much when 
                                                            
8 Managers can construct a scenario by vividly describing the events, or providing the causal links of facts, etc. For 
example, the following sentence is a scenario description – “The strong economy and the publicity given to the 
health benefits of moderate wine consumption continue to fuel consumer demand for wine. In fact, industry-wide 
sales of red wine have more than doubled in the past few years.” A corresponding list of facts would be: 1. Industry 
wide sales of red wine have more than doubled in past few years; 2. Strong economy [Sedor, 2002, p. 748 and 749]. 
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message content is clear-cut; however, message delivering is crucial if message content is 
arguable.  
Vividness. Vivid language is “(a) emotionally interesting; (b) concrete and imagery-
provoking, and (c) proximate in a sensory, temporal, or spatial way,” while pallid language is 
“more bland, sterile, or less emotionally charged” [Hales et al., 2011, p. 224]. Hales et al. [2011] 
show that vivid presentation tends to influence investors who hold contrarian positions (i.e., short 
investors in a bull market or long investors in a bear market), but the influence is less for 
investors who hold momentum positions (i.e., long investors in a bull market or short investors in 
a bear market). Interestingly, vivid presentation alleviates contrarian investors’ bias in 
interpreting news rather than deepening momentum investors’ bias in interpreting news, contrary 
to common belief in practice.  
Narrative words can vary in multiple dimensions and there is usually no database 
maintained on narrative disclosures, hence it is difficult for archival researchers to conduct 
meaningful research on narrative disclosures (see Li [2010] for a review of archival studies on 
textual disclosures). Experimental researchers are able to make unique contribution in this area 
because of their ability to hold constant other dimensions of language while varying only one 
interested dimension in their studies [Libby et al., 2002]. Experimental research provides very 
important supplements to archival findings in this area. 
5.3 Guider or Environmental Attributes 
This section analyzes the literature on how guider characteristics and/or environment 
attributes affect investors’ reactions to management earnings guidance, including guider’s 
incentives to manage earnings, guider’s prior earnings record, analyst incentives, investors’ 
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investment positions, peer company guidance strategy, operating environment uncertainty, and 
finally regulatory environment. 
5.3.1 Guider’s Incentives to Manage Earnings 
Several studies examine how managers’ incentives to manage earnings interact with other 
factors to affect investors’ reactions to earnings guidance. Hirst et al. [2007] show that investors 
take managers’ incentives to manage earnings into account when they evaluate the credibility of 
earnings guidance. Hirst et al. [2007] compare the credibility of aggregated versus disaggregated 
earnings guidance. For an aggregated guidance, investors perceive that the guidance is more 
credible when managerial compensation consists only of fixed salary (therefore low incentives to 
manipulate earnings) than when it consists largely of performance-based pay (therefore high 
incentives to manipulate earnings). One measure to improve the perceived credibility of earnings 
guidance is to provide disaggregated earnings guidance. Disaggregated earnings guidance 
reduces managers’ opportunities to meet their guided earnings through earnings management, 
therefore investors perceive higher financial reporting quality for firms providing disaggregated 
guidance (albeit the management has high incentive to manipulate earnings). 
5.3.2 Guider’s Prior Earnings Record 
Investors’ reactions to current earnings guidance may differ systematically between firms 
with prior profits versus losses. Analysts and investors assume that prior losses are less persistent 
than prior profits and hence are more motivated to rely on other relevant information (here, 
management guidance) when predicting future earnings for prior-loss firms than for prior-profit 
firms [Sedor, 2002]. 
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5.3.3 Analyst Incentives 
Analysts desires to have more accurate earnings forecasts since higher accuracy in 
earnings forecasts means better reputation and brighter career future [Brown, 2001]. Other than 
an incentive to provide accurate guidance, analysts may sometimes have incentives to maintain a 
good relationship with managers to generate business opportunities and/or gain access to 
management information [i.e., “relationship incentives;” Schipper, 1991]. The relationship 
incentives have been found to partly contribute to the observed optimistic-to-pessimistic pattern 
in analyst forecasts [Libby et al., 2008]. When analysts are provided with pessimistically biased 
earnings guidance, analysts with relationship incentives (compared with analysts with accuracy 
incentives) are more reluctant to adjust for such bias in manager earnings guidance. Their 
earnings forecasts tend to follow the downward biased pattern so that it is easy for the actual EPS 
to meet or beat the analysts’ forecasts [Tan et al., 2010]. 
5.3.4 Investors’ Investment Positions 
Investment positions (i.e., whether long-holding or short-selling a stock) may affect 
investors’ reactions to earnings guidance. Motivated reasoning theory suggests that investors are 
more likely to interpret earnings guidance with a bias toward a gain rather than a loss [Hales, 
2007]. For example, long (short) investors tend to evaluate the same EPS guidance more 
optimistically (pessimistically), since long (short) investors make a gain if stock price 
appreciates (depreciates). Han and Tan [2010] show that such an effect can occur only when 
there is enough elasticity in the news (i.e., when there is room for investors to maneuver their 
evaluation). Positive guidance is less credible than negative guidance given managers’ incentives 
to announce positive news [Lang and Lundholm, 2000]. Hence positive guidance is more elastic 
than negative guidance. Range guidance offers a range of possible future earnings, whereas point 
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guidance offers only one expected point EPS. Hence range guidance is more elastic than point 
guidance. Han and Tan [2010] find that investors are more likely to engage in motivated 
reasoning for positive guidance (compared with negative guidance) or for range guidance 
(compared with point guidance). Hales et al. [2011] suggest that investors are more sensitive to 
preference-inconsistent news than to preference-consistent news. Hales et al. [2011] demonstrate 
that investors react more strongly to vivid language than to pallid language, but this effect holds 
only for preference-inconsistent news (i.e., long/short investors reading negative/positive news) 
and not for preference-consistent news (i.e., long/short investors reading positive/negative news). 
5.3.5 Peer Company Guidance Strategy 
Maletta and Zhang [2011] suggest that investors’ reaction to a firm’s earnings guidance is 
dependent on the earnings guidance strategy of a peer firm. In particular, Maletta and Zhang 
[2011] investigate the effect of a firm’s relative guidance news surprise (i.e., how positive or 
negative the firm’s earnings guidance news is relative to peer firm earnings guidance news). 
They find that when the two firms release a similar percentage of guidance news to total earnings 
news, Miller’s [2006] finding continues to hold (i.e., investor earnings estimates are highest 
when guidance news equals half of total earnings news compared with scenarios of releasing 
guidance news that comprises 25% or 75% of total earnings news). However, when the two firms 
differ in terms of percentage of total earnings news released in guidance news, investors’ 
reactions to firm earnings guidance increase as the percentage released by the firm relative to its 
peer firm increases. Maletta and Zhang’s [2011] paper is an example of how guidance 
characteristics and environmental factors sometimes interplay to affect investors’ reactions to 
earnings guidance. 
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5.3.6 Operating Environment Uncertainty 
Rupar [2011] suggests that investors consider a firm’s operating environment uncertainty 
when reacting to earnings guidance. Rupar [2011] introduces investors’ ex ante expectations 
induced from environmental uncertainty as a factor and examines its joint effect with guidance 
form on investor earnings estimates. Rupar [2011] finds that investors’ earnings estimates (as 
well as their assessments of management credibility) are higher when guidance precision and 
investor expectations are aligned (precise/less precise guidance form with low/high 
environmental uncertainty) than when they are not aligned (less precise/precise guidance form 
with low/high environmental uncertainty). Du et al. [2011], similarly, call for matching earnings 
guidance precision with information uncertainty. More (less) precise guidance form should be 
used when information uncertainty is low (high). 
5.3.7 Regulatory Environment 
Research shows that investors consider the regulatory environment when reacting to 
management disclosures. When the disclosure format is mandated, investors perceive little room 
for managers to manipulate it and therefore are less vigilant to manager’s strategic disclosure. In 
contrast, when the disclosure format is voluntary, investors are vigilant to managers’ attempt to 
manipulate the disclosure format and therefore try to counteract the effect of this manipulation 
[Nelson and Rupar, 2011]. 
6. EFFECT OF MANAGEMENT GUIDANCE ON GUIDER BEHAVIOR 
Guidance frequency may affect manager operating activity decisions because of 
managers’ consideration on the implication of any operating decisions on earnings [since more 
frequent guidance imposes more benchmarks to evaluate actual earnings; Bhojraj and Libby, 
2005].  Wang and Tan [2013] show that a frequent guider tends to sacrifice total long-term 
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earnings to meet short-term earnings targets. That is, a frequent guider is more likely to choose 
an operating strategy with lower total expected earnings but higher earnings predictability over 
the other strategy with higher total expected earnings but lower earnings predictability.  
Management myopic behavior refers to management tendency to sacrifice long-term 
earnings growth in order to meet short-term earnings targets [Cheng et al., 2005]. Bhojraj and 
Libby [2005] suggest that increased disclosure frequency (quarterly reporting versus semiannual 
reporting) induces management myopia. Similarly, more frequent guidance (compared with less 
frequent guidance) also leads to lower research and development investment and therefore lower 
long-term earnings growth rate [Cheng et al., 2005]. The concern of management myopia has led 
to recent calls to stop short-term earnings guidance while focusing on disclosure of long-term 
strategies and goals [Hsieh et al., 2006]. Clearly, management should weigh the benefits and 
costs of issuing guidance (especially short-term guidance) and any implications of issuing 
guidance on their operating decisions [Diamond and Yevmenenko, 2011]. 
 
 
Insert Table 1 Here 
 
Table 1 summarizes the theory, main independent variables, main dependent variables, 
and key research findings of the papers reviewed in Section 4 to Section 6. 
7. FUTURE RESEARCH DIRECTIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 
In this section, I suggest several potential areas for future research based on the literature 
review above and offer concluding remarks. 
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7.1 Managers’ Personal Attributes 
The literature thus far has little to say regarding the extent to which managers’ personal 
attributes affect their earnings guidance behavior [Libby and Rennekamp, 2012]. As a result, 
there is considerable room for additional research to explore the effect of managers’ personal 
attributes on their earnings guidance decisions [Brochet et al., 2011]. Based on a small-scale 
review on literature of CEO personal attributes, I offer the following possible future research 
avenues. 
7.1.1 CEO Demographics 
Several studies have shown that overconfident managers are more likely to issue earnings 
guidance [than less overconfident managers; e.g., Hilary and Hsu, 2011; Libby and Rennekamp, 
2012]. Psychology research has demonstrated that several demographic characteristics are 
associated with overconfidence; such as age, gender, years of experience, and political 
preferences [e.g., Barber and Odean, 2001]. In particular, psychology research has documented 
mixed findings regarding the effect of age on overconfidence. Some research suggests young 
people are more overconfident than old people [Pliske and Mutter, 1996] while others suggest 
the opposite [e.g., Job, 1990]. Future research may examine the effect of the CEO’s age on 
earnings guidance behavior and whether this effect is via overconfidence. 
A recent working paper [Hutton et al., 2013] suggests that Republican managers 
(compared with Democratic managers) are more conservative in corporate policies (for instance, 
republican managers take on lower debt level and lower R&D expenses). Future research may 
investigate the effect of manager’s political ideology on their guidance behavior. 
7.1.2 CEO Self-Monitoring 
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Self-monitoring refers to a person’s sensitivity to other people’s comments and therefore 
his/her own reputation [Seybert, 2010]. Seybert [2010] finds that high self-monitoring managers 
are more likely to over-invest in R&D projects than low self-monitoring managers. Prior studies 
show that the desire for a better reputation is one of the reasons for managers to provide 
guidance [Graham et al., 2005; Hirst et al., 2008]. Future research may examine whether high 
self-monitoring managers (i.e., those managers who are more likely to alter their behaviors in 
order for a better image) are more likely to issue earnings guidance. 
7.1.3 CEO Narcissism 
Narcissists believe that they are better than most others for almost every task [Resick et 
al., 2009]. Olsen [2011] demonstrates that Narcissist CEOs tend to report higher EPS. Future 
research may investigate whether Narcissist CEOs are more likely to issue earnings guidance and 
in particular, if their earnings guidance is more optimistic (than non-Narcissist CEOs’ guidance). 
7.2 Guidance Characteristics 
7.2.1 Earnings Guidance Attributions 
Research on guidance content thus far largely examines quantitative information 
accompanying earnings guidance (e.g., disaggregated earnings guidance or sensitivity analysis). 
However, earnings guidance also often includes qualitative information [e.g., manager 
explanations as to why future earnings are predicted to be better or worse; Hutton et al., 2003; 
Baginski et al., 2004]. Experimental research has investigated attribution effects in other contexts, 
such as earnings restatements [Elliott et al., 2012] and management discussion and analysis 
[Barton and Mercer, 2005; Koonce et al., 2012]. Barton and Mercer [2005] find that analysts are 
able to differentiate plausible versus implausible explanations offered by managers for a poor 
earnings result, and they think more positively on a firm providing plausible attributions for their 
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earnings results (compared with a firm with implausible attributions).  Elliott et al. [2012] show 
that investors have greater trust in managers who accept responsibility for earnings restatements 
than in those who deny responsibility, and this difference is enlarged by an online restatement 
compared to a paper restatement. Koonce et al. [2012] express concern that investors may not be 
able to attend to the completeness of management explanations. Future research might examine 
attribution effects in the earnings guidance context and thereby complement archival research in 
this area [Rupar, 2011]. 
7.2.2 Guidance Forms 
Extant experimental research on guidance forms has focused primarily  on point or range 
guidance with relatively less emphasis on examining other guidance forms, such as minimum, 
maximum, and qualitative guidance. Nevertheless, the literature indicates that minimum and 
maximum guidance is significant in practice, accounting for 68.2% of the sample in Pownall et 
al. [1993], and 33% in Baginski et al. [2011]. In the context of contingent environmental liability 
disclosure, Kennedy et al. [1998] compare minimum and maximum estimates with best estimates 
and range estimates. Kennedy et al. [1998] find that investors tend to anchor on the numbers 
provided and generate ranges of estimated environmental liability that are too narrow. Further, 
investor risk assessments are significantly higher for a maximum environmental liability 
disclosure than for a minimum disclosure. Future research may investigate whether the results of 
Kennedy et al. [1998] generalize to the earnings guidance setting where the financial figures 
involved are much smaller in scale, or whether other variables moderate the effect of different 
guidance forms. 
Qualitative guidance accounts for a non-trivial percentage in earnings guidance as well. 
Qualitative guidance is 7.8% within the sample in Bamber and Cheon [1998]. Again, research on 
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qualitative guidance is rather limited [one exception is Libby and Tan, 1999]. Thus, future 
research examining the nature and effect of qualitative guidance will be productive. 
7.2.3 Guidance Media 
Managers may provide earnings guidance orally in earnings conference calls or in written 
form published in press releases [Bamber and Cheon, 1998]. Thus far, experimental research on 
management earnings guidance has been conducted in written format, be it on paper or 
electronically. Elliott et al. [2012] find that investor trust in management is higher (lower) when 
the manager accepts (denies) responsibility for earnings restatements via online video 
announcements, compared with text announcements. Future research may investigate how 
investors’ reactions differ for the same earnings guidance issued in different media formats. 
Based on the findings of Elliott et al. [2012], evaluations of manager personal attributes, such as 
credibility (competence and integrity), are particularly subject to media effects. 
7.2.4 Confirming Management Guidance 
For those studies that examine investors’ reactions to management guidance, almost all 
involve positive or negative guidance news. However, as indicated by Clement et al. [2003], 
approximately 19% of their total guidance sample for the 1993–1997 period relates to 
confirming guidance (i.e., there is neither a positive nor a negative surprise in the earnings 
guidance—management issues the guidance to confirm current market expectations). Future 
research may consider studying the phenomenon of confirming guidance directly, by comparing 
it with positive or negative guidance or indirectly, by studying its joint effect with other 
guidance/guider characteristics and/or environmental factors. For example, it would be 
interesting to determine whether the documented effects of disaggregated earnings guidance 
generalize to confirming guidance. 
  33
7.3 Environmental Attributes 
7.3.1 Multi Period and/or Multi-Firm Settings 
Most studies reviewed in this paper consider a single-period, single-firm scenario. In 
practice, however, management earnings guidance is a repetitive decision and investors’ 
reactions are affected not only by a firm’s own disclosure strategy, but also by the disclosure 
strategy of its peer firms. For instance, Miller [2006] documents that investors react more 
positively when the total earnings news is split equally between guidance news and actual 
earnings news, than when the total earnings news is divided into one piece of large news and one 
piece of small news. However, Maletta and Zhang [2011] show that the conclusion of Miller 
[2006] holds only when there is no contrast between the disclosure strategies of the target firm 
and its peer firm; when there is such a contrast (e.g., the percentage of total earnings news 
released in guidance news differs), investors focus on the target firm in comparison with its peer 
firm, rather than on the target firm in isolation. Researchers should incorporate this multi-firm, 
multi-period setting into their experimental designs to increase the external validity of their 
studies. Future research could also test whether findings documented in a single-firm, single-
period setting generalize to multi-firm and/or multi-period settings. 
7.3.2 Regulatory Environment 
Experimental studies have the unique advantage of creating a regulatory environment in 
the lab which may not exist in the real world, and being able to compare and contrast 
management and/or investor behaviors under existing  versus proposed regulations [Bhojraj and 
Libby, 2005; Nelson and Rupar, 2011]. Management earnings guidance is voluntary disclosure 
where very few regulations are in existence [Hirst et al., 2008]. Experimental researchers may 
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utilize their methodological advantages and continue to make contributions to policy research in 
the area of management earning guidance [Maines, 1994]. 
7.4 The Effect of Management Guidance on Guider’s Behavior 
There is little research on whether and how managers’ operating and/or other disclosing 
decisions are affected by their earnings guidance strategies (see Holderness and Hunton [2011] 
and Wang and Tan [2013] as exceptions). Future research may study how managers’ operating 
and disclosing decisions are affected by managers’ earnings guidance behavior. 
7.5 Conclusions 
This paper reviews experimental research on management earnings guidance. First, I 
review guider and environmental attributes that may affect management earnings guidance 
decisions. Next, I review whether and how investors react differently to management guidance 
characteristics, which sometimes jointly work with guider attributes and/or environmental 
attributes. Finally, I review how management earnings guidance behavior may affect their 
operating and disclosing decisions. Based on my literature synthesis, I also offer my views on 
promising future research directions. 
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Table 1 Key Research Findings1 
 
Article Theory Main  
Independent Variables 
Main  
Dependent 
Variables 
Key Research Findings 
Hirst, 
Koonce, 
and Miller 
[1999, 
JAR]2 
Source 
credibility 
Prior guidance accuracy 
(high, low) 
Guidance form (point, 
range) 
Investors’ 
confidence and 
dispersion in 
earnings 
estimates 
For guidance with inaccurate prior record, 
guidance form does not matter; for guidance 
with accurate prior record, investor 
confidence (dispersion) is higher (lower) for 
point guidance than for range guidance. 
Libby and 
Tan 
[1999, 
JAR] 
 
Cue 
consistency 
Guidance issuance (no 
guidance, sequential 
guidance, simultaneous 
guidance) 
Earnings re-
estimates after 
actual earnings 
announcement 
Analysts’ earnings re-estimates are lowest in 
sequential processing condition, followed by 
no guidance condition, then by simultaneous 
processing condition. 
Sedor 
[2002, 
TAR] 
 
Scenario 
thinking 
Information structure 
(list, scenario) 
Prior earnings (loss, 
profit) 
Earnings 
estimates after 
management 
guidance 
Analysts’ earnings estimates are more 
optimistic where management plan is 
presented as a scenario than as an 
unstructured list, and the difference is bigger 
for prior-loss firms than for prior-profit 
firms. 
Tan, 
Libby, and 
Hunton 
[2002, 
JAR] 
 
Mental 
accounting 
Total earnings news 
valence (positive, 
negative) 
Guidance news in 
proportion to total 
earnings news (50%, 
100%, 150%) 
Earnings re-
estimates after 
actual earnings 
announcement 
For positive total earnings news, earnings re-
estimates are higher (lower) when the news 
is understated (overstated) in guidance than 
when it is accurately stated in guidance. For 
negative total earnings news, earnings re-
estimates are lower (higher) when the news 
is understated (overstated) in guidance than 
when it is accurately stated in guidance. 
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Mercer 
[2005, 
TAR] 
 
Attribution 
theory and 
affective 
decision 
theory 
 
Forthcomingness 
(guiding, non-guiding) 
News valence (positive, 
negative) 
Assessment horizon 
(short, long) 
Management 
credibility 
For a short-term assessment horizon, 
management credibility is assessed higher 
for a guiding firm than for a non-guiding 
firm, and the difference is larger for negative 
guidance than for positive guidance. For a 
long-term assessment horizon, management 
credibility is determined by news valence—
higher credibility for positive news than for 
negative news—and is not affected by 
whether there is earnings guidance. 
Kadous, 
Krische, 
and Sedor 
[2006, 
TAR] 
 
Counter-
explanation 
Number of counter-
explanations (no, few, 
many)3 
Earnings 
estimates after 
management 
guidance 
Asking participants to generate a few 
counter-explanations reduces their optimism 
in earnings estimates induced by scenario 
thinking, but asking them to generate many 
counter-explanations does not reduce 
optimism. 
Libby, 
Tan, and 
Hunton 
[2006, 
TAR] 
 
Range 
precision 
effect 
Guidance error 
(downward bias, upward 
bias) 
Guidance form (point, 
narrow range, wide 
range)3 
Earnings re-
estimates after 
actual earnings 
announcement 
When the actual EPS exceeds (misses) the 
point guidance (the midpoint of the range 
guidance), investors’ earnings reestimates 
are highest (lowest) for the narrow range 
guidance (where the actual EPS fall outside 
of the range), followed by the point 
guidance, then by the wide range guidance 
(where the actual EPS fall within the range). 
Miller 
[2006, 
CAR] 
 
Diminishin
g marginal 
reactions 
and cue 
consistency 
effect 
Guidance news in 
proportion to total 
earnings news (150%, 
88.9%, 50%, 11.1%, -
50%) 
Earnings re-
estimates after 
actual earnings 
announcement 
Earnings re-estimates are highest when 
guidance news equals one-half of total 
earnings news, followed by understated 
guidance news (guidance news and actual 
earnings news are consistent in sign), then 
by overstated guidance news (guidance news 
and actual earnings news are inconsistent in 
sign). 
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Han and 
Tan [2007, 
TAR] 
 
Multiple-
reference-
points 
theory 
Guidance form (point, 
MID, range) 
Investor knowledge (high, 
low) 
Earnings re-
estimates after 
actual earnings 
announcement 
For high-knowledge participants, earnings 
re-estimates are highest for range guidance, 
followed by MID guidance, then by point 
guidance, when earnings falls in the lower 
end (missing the midpoint but above the 
lower endpoint). For low-knowledge 
participants, earnings re-estimates are not 
different between the MID guidance and 
point guidance conditions, and both are 
lower than the range guidance condition.  
Hirst, 
Koonce, 
and 
Venkatara
man 
[2007, 
JAR] 
 
Disaggrega
t-ion 
enhances 
manage-
ment 
credibility 
Earnings manipulation 
incentives (high, low) 
Guidance disaggregation 
(aggregated, 
disaggregated) 
Management 
credibility 
For disaggregated guidance, management 
incentive to manage earnings does not affect 
management credibility. For aggregated 
guidance, management credibility is higher 
for managers with low (versus high) 
incentive to manage earnings. 
 
Libby, 
Hunton, 
Tan, and 
Seybert 
[2008, 
JAR] 
 
Analysts’ 
forecasts 
are driven 
by their 
economic 
incentives 
Analysts’ incentive 
(accuracy, relationship) 
Guidance timing (early, 
late)3 
Earnings re-
estimates after 
actual earnings 
announcement 
Analysts' earnings forecasts exhibit an 
optimistic-to-pessimistic pattern (being 
optimistic early then later become 
pessimistic), and this pattern is more 
obvious for those analysts have the 
relationship incentive.  
Venkatara
man 
[2008, 
WP] 
 
Omission 
bias theory 
Guidance commitment 
(more, less committed) 
Prior guidance accuracy 
(high, low) 
Management 
credibility 
Committed disclosers (those firms with a 
regular and predictable guidance record) are 
viewed as more (less) credible than less 
committed disclosers when prior forecasts 
are more (less) accurate. 
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Du [2009, 
JBF] 
Ambiguity 
theory 
Guidance news (positive, 
negative) 
Guidance form (point, 
range) 
Investors’ 
resource 
allocation 
decision 
When guidance news is positive (negative), 
investors allocate more resource to the firm 
issuing range (point) guidance where there is 
more (less) ambiguity. 
Fleming 
[2009, 
BRIA] 
 
Expectancy 
Violation 
Theory 
Guidance disaggregation 
(disaggregated, 
aggregated) 
Guidance form (point, 
range) 
Venture 
capitalists’ 
initial 
investment 
screening 
decision 
Disaggregated guidance leads to better 
(worse) screening decision than aggregated 
guidance for point (range) guidance. 
 
Han and 
Tan [2010, 
JAR] 
 
Motivated 
reasoning 
and elastic 
justificatio
n theory 
Investor position (long, 
short) 
Guidance news valence 
(positive, negative) 
Guidance form (point, 
range) 
 
Earnings 
estimates after 
management 
guidance 
Motivated reasoning (long investors make 
higher earnings estimates than short 
investors) is more likely to occur for range 
guidance than for point guidance, and more 
likely for positive guidance than for negative 
guidance. 
Tan, 
Libby, and 
Hunton 
[2010, 
CAR] 
 
Elastic 
justificatio
n theory 
Analysts’ incentive 
(accuracy, relationship) 
Management guidance 
bias record (consistent, 
inconsistent)3 
Earnings 
estimates after 
management 
guidance 
Analysts adjust for guidance bias when they 
have accuracy objective but not so for 
relationship objective. The difference 
between these two analysts groups is greater 
for a consistent guidance record than for an 
inconsistent guidance record.  
Du, 
Budescu, 
Shelly, 
and Omer 
[2011, 
OBHDP] 
Congruity 
theory & 
ambiguity 
aversion 
theory 
Information vagueness 
(high, low) 
Guidance form (point, 
narrow range, and wide 
range) 
Investors’ 
preferences for 
more precise 
guidance form 
Investors prefer more (less) precise point 
(range) guidance form when the information 
given is less (more) ambiguous. Investors 
prefer narrow range to wide range guidance. 
Elliott, 
Hobson, 
and 
Jackson 
Activation 
of different 
knowledge 
schemes 
Guidance disaggregation 
(Aggregated, 
disaggregated)  
Actual earnings outcome 
Investment 
attractiveness 
Earnings fixation is lower for disaggregated 
than for aggregated guidance. 
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[2011, 
TAR] 
 
associated 
with 
earnings 
(favorable, unfavorable) 
Hales, 
Kuang, 
and 
Venkatara
man 
[2011, 
JAR] 
 
Motivated 
reasoning 
and 
vividness 
effect 
Investor position (long, 
short) 
Language vividness 
(vivid, pallid) 
Earnings 
growth 
For positive news, short investors who 
receive vivid presentation assess higher 
future earnings growth than those who 
receive pallid presentation. Long investors 
are less affected by presentation vividness. 
For negative news, long investors who 
receive vivid presentation assess lower 
future earnings growth than those who 
receive pallid presentation. Short investors 
are less affected by presentation vividness. 
Holdernes
s and 
Hunton 
[2011, 
WP] 
 
Strategic 
information 
transmissio
n theory 
and 
anticipator
y 
obfuscation 
theory 
Earnings management 
pressure (absent, present) 
Disaggregated guidance 
pressure (absent, present) 
What Income 
Statement items 
to disclose in 
their earnings 
guidance 
Managers who are under pressure to manage 
earnings choose to aggregate information 
where earnings management takes place 
(i.e., not to disclose) and disaggregate 
guidance in other places (i.e., to disclose). 
Managers who are not under pressure to 
manage earnings do not exhibit such a 
guidance disaggregation pattern. 
Maletta 
and Zhang 
[2011, 
CAR] 
 
Contrast 
effect 
Guidance news in 
proportion to total news 
(25%, 50%, 75%) 
Guidance provider (own 
firm, peer firm) 
 
Earnings re-
estimates after 
actual earnings 
announcement 
When there is no difference in terms of 
percentage of guidance news relative to total 
earnings news between the target and peer 
firms, investor re-estimates for the target 
firm are higher when 50% of the total 
earnings news is released in guidance. 
When there is a difference in terms of 
percentage of guidance news relative to total 
earnings news between the target and the 
peer firms, investors’ re-estimates for the 
target firm are higher if the target firm 
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releases more positive news in guidance 
(than the peer firm). 
 
Nelson 
and Rupar 
[2011, 
WP] 
 
Ratio bias 
effect 
Numerical format (dollar, 
percentage) 
Disclosure management 
opportunity (mandatory, 
voluntary) 
Disclosure management 
incentive (low, high)3 
Investment risk 
perception 
For the mandatory disclosure format, 
investor risk assessment is higher for dollar 
disclosure than for percentage disclosure in 
the sensitivity analysis. 
For the discretionary disclosure format, 
investor risk assessment is not different 
between dollar and percentage disclosure in 
the sensitivity analysis.  
Rupar 
[2011, 
WP] 
 
Attribution 
theory 
Guidance form (point, 
range) 
Environmental uncertainty 
(high, low) 
Management 
credibility, 
Firm growth 
expectations, 
Stock price 
estimates 
 
Within each uncertainty setting, when 
management guidance form is aligned with 
its operating environment uncertainty (i.e., 
point/range guidance for low/high 
uncertainty), management credibility is 
assessed to be higher, which in turn leads to 
higher growth expectations and higher stock 
price estimates, relative to when 
management guidance form is misaligned 
with its operating environment uncertainty 
(i.e., point/range guidance for high/low 
uncertainty). 
Tan and 
Koonce 
[2011, 
AOS] 
 
Affect 
theory 
Guided EPS (low, high) 
Retraction & correction 
(both retraction & 
correction, correction 
only)3 
Earnings 
potential, 
investment 
attractiveness 
When guidance news is retracted, investors 
cannot fully eliminate the impact of previous 
erroneous disclosure. When guidance news 
is retracted and corrected, investors tend to 
over-react by overweighting the new 
corrected news. 
Libby and 
Rennekam
p [2012, 
JAR] 
Over-
confidence 
Task difficulty (easy, 
difficult) 
Commitment to 
high 
performance in 
second round 
Overconfident managers (for whom the 
overconfidence is induced by an easy task) 
are more likely provide earnings guidance. 
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1This table summarizes the theory, main independent variables, main dependent variables, and key research findings of the 29 papers reviewed. 
2I include the journal name in brackets. JAR is a short for Journal of Accounting Research, TAR is a short for The Accounting Review, CAR is a short for 
Contemporary Accounting Research, AOS is a short for Accounting, Organization, and Society, BRIA is a short for Behavioral Research in Accounting, JBF is a 
short for Journal of Behavioral Finance, OBHDP is a short for Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, and WP stands for working paper. 
 
Rennekam
p [2012, 
JAR] 
 
Processing 
fluency 
News nature (positive, 
negative) 
Readability (high, low) 
Valuation 
judgment; 
management 
credibility 
More readable disclosures make investors’ 
reaction to positive (negative) guidance 
more positive (negative) compared to less 
readable disclosures. 
 
 
Tan, 
Wang, and 
Zhou 
[2012, 
WP] 
 
Readability 
effect; 
message 
consistency 
effect 
Message consistency 
(high, low) 
Language readability 
(high, low) 
Disclosure 
credibility 
Valuation 
judgment 
Readability matters only when messages are 
inconsistent, but not when messages are 
consistent. 
When messages are inconsistent, more 
readable disclosures lead to higher 
disclosure credibility, and also higher 
valuation judgment, than less readable 
disclosures. 
 
Wang and 
Tan [2013, 
JAR] 
Mental 
accounting 
and goal 
setting 
theory 
Guidance frequency 
(frequent, infrequent) 
Guidance goal (accurate, 
beat/meet) 
Marketing 
strategy 
preference and 
choice 
Frequent guiders tend to prefer the 
marketing strategy with more predictable 
quarterly earnings (but with lower total 
expected earnings) than infrequent guiders. 
Accuracy-goal guiders tend to prefer the 
marketing strategy with higher predictable 
quarterly earnings (but with lower total 
expected earnings) than beat/meet-goal 
guiders. 
The difference in preference between 
guiders with different goals is smaller for 
frequent guiders than for infrequent guiders. 
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3Based on Experiment 1. 
4Based on Experiments 3 and 4, which are related to sensitivity disclosure. 
